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AN ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT
UNION AND CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Throughout the history of the United States, various attempts have
been made to prevent the corporate giants from controlling elections
and political parties. As the trade labor movement developed and pro-
duced hugh labor unions, it was felt by many that the evil of allowing
unions to exert great influence in the area of partisan politics was as
great as allowing corporations to exert this influence. This concern
culminated in a provision which was incorporated into the Taft-Hartley
Labor Act in 1947 and which is now designated as 18 U.S.C. 610.1 The
statute reads :
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organ-
ized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any election to any political
office, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political
office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization
to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a
Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commis-
sioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any
primary election or political convention or caucus held to select
candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate,
political committee, or other person to accept or receive any con-
tribution prohibited by this section.
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any con-
tribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined
not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any cor-
poration, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to
any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor
organization, as the case may be, and any person who accepts
or receives any contribution, in violation of this section, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both; and if the violation was wilful, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
For the purposes of this section "labor organization" means
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or condition of work.
It should be pointed out that this criminal statute prohibits both
contributions and expenditures, and that the statute restricts labor or-
ganizations as well as corporations. Of course this Federal statute ap-
1 Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act is basically the same as 18 U.S.C. 610.
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plies only to Federal elections, so that individual states are free to enact
state Corrupt Practice Acts to apply to state political activity.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the years following the Civil War and continuing into the Twen-
tieth century, the voices calling for Congressional action to curb the
political activity of corporations became louder and louder. This con-
cern was directed primarily toward the powerful railroads and insur-
ance companies. As a democracy depends upon an intelligent electorate
for survival, it was felt that massive political spending by the corpora-
tions of the nation was, in effect, taking the freedom of choice from
individuals and granting it to the corporate leaders who could control
elections as well as politicians with money. In 1907 a statute was en-
acted by Congress which made it unlawful for any corporation to make
a money contribution in connection with any election of any political
candidate.2 This "Act of 1907" was merely the first concrete manifesta-
tion of a continuing Congressional concern for elections "free from the
power of money." 3
This 1907 legislation was strengthened in 1925 by changing the term
,'money contribution" to "contribution" and by penalizing the recipient
of any forbidden contribution as well as the contributor.4 With the
enactment of that statute it seems that adequate legislation was on the
books to keep corporations from making direct contributions to candi-
dates and parties. In 1943 labor organizations were placed under the
same restrictions for the duration of the war.'
After the termination of the war, great concern was heard that the
present restrictions were not stringent enough. A large area of dispute
centered around the word "contribution". "Of what avail would a law
be to prohibit the contributing direct to a candidate and yet permit the
expenditure of large sums in his behalf."' 6 This segment of a report of
the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures
(1946) indicates that the present prohibition against direct contribu-
tions was being circumvented by making indirect contributions for the
benefit of a candidate rather than directly to him. In 1947 the Taft-
Hartley Act was passed by Congress and our present prohibition
against both contributions and expenditures by labor organizations as
well as corporations came into existence.
234 Stat 864 (1907).
3 United States v. International Union Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 575, (1957).
The last six words are from a quote by Samuel Gompers, President of the
American Federation of Labor.
4 43 Stat. 1070 which was Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practice Act of
1925 (1925).
5 57 Stat. 163, 167 (1943). Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act was ex-
tended to labor unions for the duration of the war as part of the Smith-
Connally Act.
6 H.R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37.
.1962-63]
MARQUETTE LATW REVIEW
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING 18 U.S.C. 610
Senator Taft (R-Ohio), co-author of the Taft-Hartley Act, de-
scribed the purpose of the statute we are concerned with very clearly.
But the prohibition is against labor unions using their members
dues for political purposes, which is exactly the same as the pro-
hibition against a corporation using the stockholders' money for
political purposes, and perhaps in violation of the wishes of many
of its stockholders. [emphasis added]"
By this expression of intent Senator Taft indicated that unions
could organize separate associations as the CIO had already done with
its Political Action Committee and the AFL-CIO later did with its
Committee on Political Education. The test was that these separate
associations must be supported solely by voluntary contributions with
no use of any union member's dues. If money from dues was used, it
would be a violation of the statute. The reason for this test becomes
apparent when one considers that many individuals are required to join
a union as a condition to the continuance of employment.
Many sections of the Taft-Hartley Act were hotly opposed in Con-
gress, and Section 304, which was essentially the same as 18 U.S.C. 610,
was no exception. Senator Pepper (D-Fla.) was one of the leading
Congressional opponents of the statute. His contention was:
This prohibition, therefore, is denying to citizens of this nation
the right of free press, the right of free speech, the right of dis-
seminating information of public value. It is a chain upon the
citizens activity, and we well know that these labor organizations
are composed of working people. They do not have people who
are their members who can contribute hundreds of thousands or
millions of dollars to political campaigns. They have to do it
collectively."
Senator Pepper made this statement after Senator Taft had indi-
cated that unions could validly form associations by which union mem-
bers would be able to collectively support political parties or candidates
as long as this support was through voluntary contributions. This makes
it rather difficult to follow Senator Pepper's argument. Certain it is,
however, that Senator Pepper, although opposed to the section, under-
stood it to mean that labor unions and corporations would be barred
from "disseminating information of public value."9 This apparently
would include any expenditure for newspaper advertisements or radio
and television time.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD "EXPENDITURE"
Although the prohibition against "contributions" failed to evoke
much controversy, the ban on "expenditures" was immediately chal-




lenged. A few weeks after the prohibition was enacted, the regular CIO
newspaper printed a statement by Phillip Murray, President of the
CIO, stating, in essence, that all CIO members should vote for a certain
candidate in a Maryland election. Mr. Murray and his union were
promptly indicted under the statute. The Federal District Court dis-
missed the indictment on the ground that 18 U.S.C. 610 "is an uncon-
stitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, freedom of the press and
freedom of assembly."'10 On appeal, it was conceded by both sides that
Murray's activity was covered by the word "expenditure", and the only
issue was the constitutionality of the statute."' However, the United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations,12 declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute and
held that the publication by a union, financed by its general funds, of a
regular periodical advertising the election to federal office of a particu-
lar candidate, was not an expenditure as contemplated by 18 U.S.C.
610. This result seemed contrary to the legislative intent, as Senator
Taft had stated specifically that an expenditure~of this type would be
barred,13 and Senator Pepper's statement quoted earlier indicated that
he also felt that this type activity would be prohibited.
The following year a case involving the statute arose in Connecticut.
A small painter's local took regular union funds and sponsored a politi-
cal broadcast urging defeat of Senator Taft and rejection of all Re-
publican incumbent Congressmen. This broadcast was carried over a
general, commercial radio station. As in the CIO case, no contention
was made that the statute was inapplicable; the sole defense being the
unconstitutionality of the statute. In United States v. Painters Local
Union No. 411,14 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also avoided the
constitutional issue and held this advertisement was not a prohibited
expenditure as "it seems impossible, on principle, to differentiate the
scope of that decision (U.S. v. CIO) from the use we have before us."'
These two decisions rendered the ban on "expenditures" virtually
worthless, at least in the area of commercial communication. They also
terminated any indictments for seven years. However, in 1956, the
United Auto Workers union was indicted for using dues money to pay
for broadcasts "urging and endorsing" the election of Senator McNa-
mara and certain other Democrats for Congress. The Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that union-paid tele-
10 United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 77 F. Supp. 355, 357
(D.D.C. 1948).
"Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 156 (1960-
61).
12335 U.S. 106 (1948).3Supra note 7, at 6598.
14 172 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1949).
Is Id. at 856.
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vision advertisements were not prohibited by the statute. 6 The District
Court stated: "what the Supreme Court has said (in U.S. v. CIO) is
not ambiguous to us."'1 7 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished the two cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the ma-
jority in United States v. International Union United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agriculture Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO ),18
said that in the CIO case the union had "merely distributed its house
organ to its own people", while here they were using "union funds to
influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a
political party."' 9 So, this case determined that a political advertisement
by a union, if paid with dues money, over a television station beamed
to the general public was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 610. This is the last
time the Supreme Court has acted directly on the statute.
The most recent case involving the statute was United States v.
Anchorage Central Labor Council.20 In a fact situation practically the
same as in U.S. v. U4 W, a labor union organization was indicted for
violating 18 U.S.C. 610 by sponsoring television programs which were
expressions of political advocacy and were intended to influence both
union members and non-members. The Federal District Court for the
District of Alaska distinguished the two cases in that, here, the labor
organization was not an individual union, but rather an association of
some twenty-six local labor unions which obtained the money to pay for
the television broadcasts from contributions made by the individual
unions. The judged refered to the UAW case and the elements that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter suggested are necessary for a violation. The judge
felt that the most important element for consideration is whether or
not the broadcast complained of was paid for out of the general union
dues of the union membership or whether the funds may be "fairly
said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis." 2 1 He arrived at the
conclusion that even though the money came from the general treasury
of the individual unions, it was obtained on a voluntary basis because
the union membership voted to pay it to the association which ultimately
made the expenditure.
No union was called upon to pay for this program. Each union
decided by a vote of its membership, according to the testimony,
first, whether they would contribute, and second, how much.
'16United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America (AUW-CIO), 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Mich. 1956).
17 Id. at 59.
1s Supra note 3.
19 Id. at 589.
20 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961).
21 Id. at 506. Quoting from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the UAW case
at 352 U.S. 567, 592.
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Surely, that is voluntary; and that, I think, is the crux of the
situation here.22
It appears that the only differentiation between the facts in the
UAW case and the Anchorage case was that in the former the expendi-
ture was prohibited because it was made directly from a union's treas-
ury to a political activity while in the latter the expenditure was made
from a union's treasury to an association of unions and then to the
political activity. It is questionable whether this distinction in method
should lead to different results as in both cases a union member's dues
could be used for political purposes which he might not favor.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. 610
Besides being weakened by judicial interpretation, 18 U.S.C. 610
has also been directly attacked as being unconstitutional under the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The theory be-
hind this argument is that to bar expenditures by unions for partisan
political activities is to deny unionists the right of expression. The
United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the constitu-
tionality of the statute, although some of the Justices have made it
clear that they feel the statute is unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Douglas
is one of these, as is evidenced by his dissent in the UAW case. He
suggests, "if minorities need protection against the use of union funds
for political speechmaking, there are ways of reaching that end without
denying the majority their First Amendment rights."23 In a footnote to
his opinion, he suggests that an alternative would be to permit the
minority to withdraw their funds from that activity if they do not sym-
pathize with the cause. 24 The alternative suggested would seem to solve
the problem by making the "expenditures" voluntary in nature, pro-
vided the individual would be allowed to receive back his pro-rata share
of the expenditure made to a political cause he does not wish to support.
But, if the alternative means that if a member of the minority does not
wish to contribute, and makes this fact known so that his share is with-
drawn from the expenditure but left in the treasury, this would be
ineffective in protecting the member because it would allow the union
majority to use his funds for regular union expenses and free the rest
of the treasury for political activities.
Although Justices Douglas and Black and Chief Justice Warren are
often pointed out as the guardians of minority groups, their well-known
philosophies do not seem to extend to minorities in unions who do not
sympathize with the political views of the majority of the union.
Behind this question is the idea that there may be a minority of
union members who are of a different political school than their
22 Id. at 506.
2s Supra note 3, at 597.
24 Id. at 597.
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leaders and who object to the use of their union dues to espouse
one political view. This is a question that concerns the internal
management of union affairs. To date, unions have operated
under a rule of the majority. Perhaps minority rights need pro-
tection. But this way of doing it is, indeed, burning down the
house to roast the pig. All union expenditures for political dis-
course are banned because a minority might object. [emphasis
added] 25
Although few will argue that unions should and must operate under
a rule of the majority of their members, a strong argument can be
made that this majority rule should be applied only to activities for
which unions were founded, and not for activities which are outside
that realm. It is highly doubtful that participation in partisan politics
is a real reason why labor has organized. This is especially true where
the political activities correlate in no way with legitimate union activi-
ties. Men join unions to increase their bargaining power with manage-
ment, not to increase their political power through a pooling of money
to back political candidates. The Code Provision, 18 U.S.C. 610, was
enacted for the purpose of prohibiting the union's use of member's
money for such partisan political activities.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression is one
that every true American holds in high esteem. However, it is difficult
to follow the reasoning of those who claim that 18 U.S.C. 610 denies
this freedom and should be struck down as being unconstitutional. The
guarantee of freedom of expression is one that belongs to the indi-
viduals, and the statute in no way prevents the individuals from ex-
pending their own money for political purposes, or from having the
union collect it and expend it together with that collected from other
unionists. The only requirement should be that it be given voluntarily
for that purpose. Even if 18 U.S.C. 610 was enforced according to the
strict letter of the statute, individual union members would be able to
participate in partisan political discourse through organizations such as
the Committee on Political Education, as long as they are financed
through such voluntary contributions.
After about 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 610 seems to be a very ineffective
method of preventing unions from using dues money for partisan politi-
cal activity as is evidenced by the Anchorage case. This is apparent when
radio, television and newspaper advertisements paid for by labor unions
with dues money are heard and seen in the midst of campaigns advocat-
ing election of certain candidates, or when tickets for high-priced politi-
cal dinners, which in effect are contributions to a candidate or party,
are purchased from union treasuries. The blame for its ineffectiveness
must be placed to some extent on the courts. By declaring certain ex-
25 Id. at 596.
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penditures by unions not to be "expenditures" under the statute, the
courts seem to have followed neither the letter nor the spirit of the
statute and have made it a near nullity. They have also made it very
difficult for the unions to know when they are violating the law. Its
present status is certainly unsatisfactory as the result intended has not
been realized. The statute should either be enforced vigorously, declared
unconstitutional or repealed.
MA-CHINISTS V. STPE
It is entirely plausible that the protection of the unionist in the
political minority of the union may be reached under the decision of
International Association of Machinists v. Street26 without even using
18 U.S.C. 610. This 1961 Supreme Court decision involved suit by a
group of railroad employees to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop
agreement, entered into between their employer railroad and the Ma-
chinists union, which required all employees to join the union and pay
initiation fees, assessments, and dues in order to keep their jobs. The
complaint alleged that a substantial part of the money each of these
employees was compelled to pay was used, over his protest, to finance
the campaigns of political candidates whom he opposed, and to promote
the propogation of political and economic doctrines, concepts, and
idealogies with which he disagreed.2 7 The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court decision which enjoined the enforcement of the
union-shop agreement and awarded some of the employees money
judgments for the money they had been required to pay.28 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, disallowing any injunc-
tion. However, the court interpreted 45 U.S.C. 152 Eleventh (a part of
the Railway Labor Act) "to deny the unions, over an employee's objec-
tion, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which
he opposes. ' 29 This pertinent section of the Railway Labor Act gives
railroad unions the power to form a union-shop, and it should neces-
sarily follow that a similar provision of the National Labor Relations
Act 0 would be construed in the same fashion to prohibit the use of dues
money for political purposes by all the unions governed by the National
Labor Relations Act, over an employee's objection.
The court made it very clear that "Any remedies, however, would
properly be granted only to employees who have made known to the
union officials that they do not desire their funds to be used for political
causes to which they object."'31 The court then suggested two possible
remedies :32
26367 U.S. 740 (1961).
27 Id. at 744.
28215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E. 2d 796 (1959).
29Supra note 26, at 740-41.
30 29 U.S.C. 157.
31 Supra note 26, at 774.
32 Id. at 774-75.
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1. Injunction against expenditures for political causes opposed by
each complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent
by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys
exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures
made for such political activities to the union's total budget.
2. Restitution to each individual employee of that portion of his
money which the union expended, despite his notification, for the politi-
cal causes to which he had advised the union he was opposed.
The crux of the decision is that by Section 2, Eleventh of the Rail-
way Labor Act, Congress intended to, and impliedly did, limit the use
that railroad labor unions may make of dues, fees, and assessments of
union members. The same result will probably be arrived at under the
Labor-Management Relations Act.
The Machinists case shows that 18 U.S.C. 610 is not needed in pre-
venting unions from expending dues money for political purposes which
a unionist does not want spent. Although it places an affirmative duty
on the individual union member to notify his union officers that he does
not desire to have his money spent to support political causes which he
-opposes, it does give the minority member a definite weapon. No con-
tention was made in this case that any of the expenditures involved
were made in violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C.
610, or any state corrupt practice legislation. 33
CONCLUSION
It should be noted that although 18 U.S.C. 610 applies to corpora-
tions as well as labor unions, the litigation has been directed towards
labor unions exclusively. It is difficult to determine whether the statute
has succeeded in preventing corporations from expending the stock-
holders' money for partisan political activity, or whether the statutory
ban is being avoided by other means. One apparent danger in the cor-
porate area is that if, under the statute, labor unions have the power to
spend the members' dues money for activities which the courts do not
consider "expenditures" under the statute, then similarly corporations
are able to make the same type expenditure. This places the corpora-
tions themselves right back into the political arena.
After about 15 years under 18 U.S.C. 610, it is quite apparent that
the statute has failed in its attempt to protect minorities which do not
desire to finance political activities which they are not in favor of. Al-
though Machinists v. Street had indicated that relief may be granted
to these minorities without the use of the statute, it is still too early to
know the full impact of the case. There is something to be said also in
favor of relaxing any limitations on union and corporation spending
in politics for the simple reason that both groups are somewhat depend-
33 Id. at 773 (footnote).
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ant on a legislative attitude favorable to them for further gains. The
high cost of seeking public office today practically necessitates obtaining
financial backing from various groups. However, the wiser policy would
appear to be to allow union and corporate contributions and expendi-
tures to be allowed only when purely voluntary, so as not to smack of
extortion in any way.
Certainly labor unionists should be allowed to actively support those
political candidates who will support the union position. The same holds
true of stockholders in regard to candidates who support their position.
But, on the other hand, individual members of both groups should be
allowed to support the political candidates and parties of their own
choice, and if they do not wish to help finance any candidate or party,
they should be allowed to realize this desire. 18 U.S.C. 610 has largely
been a failure in this respect. Machinists v. Street has probably opened
the door to a favorable conclusion that will help protect the individual
members while allowing unions to be active in politics.
This article is not intended to cover groups other than corporations
and labor organizations in which a similar problem may be present. For
example, if an attorney must belong to an integrated bar association in
order to practice law in a particular state, it should not be proper for
the bar association to expend funds paid by him, as required dues, for
the furtherance of political activities which he may be opposed to. Mr.
Justice Black in his dissent in the UAW case summed it up very well
by quoting from Thomas Jefferson.
To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinion which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyran-
nical.3 4
JOHN D. PAYANT
34 BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST, 354 (1948).
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